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    <title type="text">McCarn &amp; Weir, PC</title>
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    <updated>2026-05-13T21:20:53Z</updated>

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        <entry>
            <author>
									                    <name>On Behalf of McCarn, Weir, &amp; Sherwood Attorneys at Law</name>
				            </author>
            <title type="html"><![CDATA[Preventing wind and solar leases from conflicting with mineral rights]]></title>
            <link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://www.mwlawfirm.com/blog/2026/01/preventing-wind-and-solar-leases-from-conflicting-with-mineral-rights/" />
            <id>https://www.mwlawfirm.com/?p=53685</id>
            <updated>2026-01-12T17:31:55Z</updated>
            <published>2026-01-12T17:31:55Z</published>
					<taxo:topics><![CDATA[-]]></taxo:topics>
            <summary type="html"><![CDATA[Energy leases are a common way for Texas property owners to generate passive income. Many property owners may have mineral leases in place, granting others oil and gas extraction rights at their properties. They may also want to consider negotiating lease terms for renewable energy production on their property. Many of the same parcels that feature potential oil and gas…]]></summary>
			                <content type="html" xml:base="https://www.mwlawfirm.com/blog/2026/01/preventing-wind-and-solar-leases-from-conflicting-with-mineral-rights/"><![CDATA[Energy leases are a common way for Texas property owners to generate passive income. Many property owners may have mineral leases in place, granting others oil and gas extraction rights at their properties.

They may also want to consider negotiating lease terms for renewable energy production on their property. Many of the same parcels that feature potential oil and gas reserves also have excellent solar exposure and enough wind to make turbine installation profitable. It is theoretically possible to negotiate a renewable energy lease for oil or solar energy production at a property while simultaneously protecting mineral lease rights and avoiding conflict.

What do those who already have mineral leases in place need to know about negotiating leases for renewable energy production as well?
<h2>Consider the possibility of interference</h2>
Frequently, one of the biggest concerns about the overlap between mineral leases and renewable energy releases is the possibility of machinery or other improvements erected on the property interfering with renewable energy production.

Extraction facilities can create shade that impacts solar energy production and possibly also wind movement across the property. Particularly when renewing mineral leases, imposing limitations on extraction near renewable energy production sites may be necessary.
<h2>Assess the status of mineral rights</h2>
In some cases, <a href="https://www.investopedia.com/terms/m/mineral-rights.asp#toc-key-considerations-when-dealing-with-mineral-rights" data-wpel-link="external" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer">mineral rights</a> are technically separate from land ownership and access rights. If there have already been legal steps to sever mineral rights from land ownership rights, there could be complications in the future.

The party that holds mineral rights may technically have more legal leverage than the landowner regarding the use of the property for renewable energy production. Many times, the mineral estate is the dominant estate on the property, which can impact both the private use of the property by the landowner and the rights of any companies signing wind or solar leases on the property.

To effectively protect the owner’s rights and avoid violations of a mineral lease, it is often necessary to review existing leases carefully, negotiate new terms at the time of renewal and customize wind or solar leases to avoid violating the rights of the mineral estate. Most people can’t manage that process on their own behalf.

Professionals who understand mineral rights and <a href="https://www.mwlawfirm.com/renewable-energy/" data-wpel-link="internal">renewable energy leases</a> can help property owners protect themselves in complex situations. Real property owners trying to diversify energy production and sources of revenue may need to take advantage of skilled legal guidance as they prepare to generate renewable energy on their land, and that’s okay.]]></content>
						        </entry>
	        <entry>
            <author>
									                    <name>On Behalf of McCarn, Weir, &amp; Sherwood Attorneys at Law</name>
				            </author>
            <title type="html"><![CDATA[Solar vs. mineral rights: Who controls land use in Texas?]]></title>
            <link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://www.mwlawfirm.com/blog/2025/09/solar-vs-mineral-rights-who-controls-land-use-in-texas/" />
            <id>https://www.mwlawfirm.com/?p=53668</id>
            <updated>2025-09-11T10:54:46Z</updated>
            <published>2025-09-11T10:54:46Z</published>
					<taxo:topics><![CDATA[-]]></taxo:topics>
            <summary type="html"><![CDATA[Conflicts between solar developers and mineral rights owners often come down to who ultimately controls the land. In Texas, the law is clear that mineral rights usually take precedence. Here’s what that means for corporations. Mineral rights take priority over solar development Mineral rights owners hold the dominant estate in Texas. That gives them authority to use the surface in…]]></summary>
			                <content type="html" xml:base="https://www.mwlawfirm.com/blog/2025/09/solar-vs-mineral-rights-who-controls-land-use-in-texas/"><![CDATA[Conflicts between solar developers and mineral rights owners often come down to who ultimately controls the land. In Texas, the law is clear that mineral rights usually take precedence. Here’s what that means for corporations.
<h2>Mineral rights take priority over solar development</h2>
Mineral rights owners hold the dominant estate in Texas. That gives them <a href="https://www.rrc.texas.gov/about-us/faqs/oil-gas-faq/oil-gas-exploration-and-surface-ownership/" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer" data-wpel-link="external">authority to use the surface</a> in any way that allows access to oil, gas or other minerals. Courts have upheld this principle for decades because it creates predictability for mineral development. It also reflects the state’s history of prioritizing energy extraction.

For corporations, that dominance means a solar project cannot assume protection from interference. Every panel, transmission line or road must account for the possibility that mineral activity will take priority. Failing to plan for that reality exposes a project to risks that can affect budgets and timelines.
<h2>A surface use waiver gives corporations protection</h2>
A waiver shifts some of that control by limiting how far mineral rights owners interfere with solar development. Without it, drilling equipment can move onto the same ground where panels stand. That can leave corporations with losses that go far beyond construction costs.

With a waiver, the terms change. It can restrict how close drilling occurs, require alternate access routes or set financial obligations if disruption happens. Negotiating a waiver does more than check a legal box. It secures operational certainty in a setting where mineral dominance otherwise dictates outcomes.
<h2>Corporations must secure agreements before development</h2>
Corporations protect projects by reviewing mineral leases, negotiating with rights holders and putting agreements in place before any construction starts. Many leases last for decades, and ignoring them invites sudden interruptions no developer can afford.

Beyond contracts, corporations also need to account for regulatory and environmental reviews, because mineral conflicts can stall those approvals and drive up costs. Handling these issues early avoids disputes, gives investors confidence and keeps projects moving in line with business goals.
<h2>Protecting energy investments</h2>
Corporations that address mineral rights conflicts early avoid disputes that drain projects of time and capital. However, reaching that point takes more than good planning. By negotiating waivers and contracts with legal support, developers move forward on solid ground and <a href="https://www.mwlawfirm.com/renewable-energy/" target="_blank" rel="noopener" data-wpel-link="internal">reduce the risk of costly interruptions</a>.]]></content>
						        </entry>
	        <entry>
            <author>
									                    <name>On Behalf of McCarn, Weir, &amp; Sherwood Attorneys at Law</name>
				            </author>
            <title type="html"><![CDATA[Texas oil royalties: Spotting illegal post-production charges]]></title>
            <link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://www.mwlawfirm.com/blog/2025/09/texas-oil-royalties-spotting-illegal-post-production-charges/" />
            <id>https://www.mwlawfirm.com/?p=53667</id>
            <updated>2025-09-11T12:06:55Z</updated>
            <published>2025-09-11T08:45:54Z</published>
					<taxo:topics><![CDATA[-]]></taxo:topics>
            <summary type="html"><![CDATA[If you own mineral rights in Texas, your royalty checks should reflect the true value of your share. Yet many oil companies deduct post-production costs that may not be allowed. Some charges are legal, but others violate state law and reduce what you are owed. Knowing when a deduction crosses the line can help you protect your income and hold…]]></summary>
			                <content type="html" xml:base="https://www.mwlawfirm.com/blog/2025/09/texas-oil-royalties-spotting-illegal-post-production-charges/"><![CDATA[If you own mineral rights in Texas, your royalty checks should reflect the true value of your share. Yet many oil companies deduct post-production costs that may not be allowed. Some charges are legal, but others violate state law and reduce what you are owed. Knowing when a deduction crosses the line can help you protect your income and hold companies accountable.
<h2>How post-production costs affect Texas royalties</h2>
Post-production costs are the expenses an operator charges after the product leaves the wellhead. These costs usually include gathering, compressing, processing and transporting the product. Companies claim these charges reflect the true cost of moving oil or gas to market, but they also reduce the value of your royalty check.

Leases sometimes allow these deductions, but many owners overlook the impact these deductions can have over time. Small charges accumulate and lower your monthly income over time. Knowing which charges are valid and which are not is the first step to <a href="/oil-and-gas/" data-wpel-link="internal">protecting your royalties</a>.

This raises the question of when deductions become unlawful.
<h2>When does post-production deduction become illegal?</h2>
Not every deduction an operator makes follows the law. Problems arise when an operator deducts expenses that the lease does not permit or inflates costs to lower your payment. Deductions can also be illegal if the company misrepresents charges or hides them in complex accounting.

Texas courts often hear cases from royalty owners who say companies paid them less than owed due to improper deductions. Judges review lease terms closely to decide whether an operator acted within its rights. In many cases, <a href="https://www.nortonrosefulbright.com/fr-fr/knowledge/publications/9c0a75ac/texas-supreme-court-holds-that-oil-and-gas-royalties" data-wpel-link="external" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer">courts side with royalty owners</a> when companies go beyond what the contract allows.

These disputes highlight the need to take active steps to protect your rights and prevent ongoing losses.
<h2>Protecting your rights as a royalty owner</h2>
Royalty owners should watch their statements carefully and act quickly if something looks wrong. Key steps to check include:
<ul>
 	<li aria-level="1"><strong>Review lease agreements:</strong> Identify what costs the operator can legally deduct.</li>
 	<li aria-level="1"><strong>Track deductions:</strong> Monitor statements to confirm accuracy and consistency.</li>
 	<li aria-level="1"><strong>Compare payments:</strong> Verify that your royalties match production volumes and market prices.</li>
 	<li aria-level="1"><strong>Question unusual charges:</strong> Request explanations for deductions that appear inflated or unclear.</li>
</ul>
These actions give you a stronger position if you challenge a company’s practices. They also provide useful records if you decide to pursue legal action in the future.

This review process naturally leads to considering how legal action fits into protecting your financial interests.
<h2>Legal support for oil and gas royalty disputes</h2>
Royalty owners often need legal action to resolve disputes over post-production costs. They often go to court to challenge unlawful deductions and recover unpaid royalties. These cases can be complex, but courts give careful attention to contracts and accounting records.

You can find resources to protect oil and gas rights and <a href="/oil-and-gas/mineral-rights-and-leasing/" data-wpel-link="internal">mineral rights</a>. If you suspect a company is making illegal deductions, consider consulting with an attorney who focuses on oil and gas disputes in Texas. Taking action now can help secure the payments you are owed and prevent further losses.]]></content>
						        </entry>
	        <entry>
            <author>
									                    <name>On Behalf of McCarn, Weir, &amp; Sherwood Attorneys at Law</name>
				            </author>
            <title type="html"><![CDATA[The real estate industry sees a milestone settlement]]></title>
            <link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://www.mwlawfirm.com/blog/2024/04/the-real-estate-industry-sees-a-milestone-settlement/" />
            <id>https://www.mwlawfirm.com/?p=53556</id>
            <updated>2024-04-24T18:20:29Z</updated>
            <published>2024-04-24T18:20:29Z</published>
					<taxo:topics><![CDATA[-]]></taxo:topics>
            <summary type="html"><![CDATA[The National Association of Realtors (NAR) recently settled a national lawsuit that arose from claims that the industry has been conspiring to maintain high commission rates for agents. The $418 million settlement aims to give home buyers more leverage to negotiate with their agents. It could encourage them to navigate the process without agents, potentially reducing commission rates and impacting…]]></summary>
			                <content type="html" xml:base="https://www.mwlawfirm.com/blog/2024/04/the-real-estate-industry-sees-a-milestone-settlement/"><![CDATA[The National Association of Realtors (NAR) recently settled a national lawsuit that arose from claims that the industry has been conspiring to maintain high commission rates for agents. The <a href="https://www.msn.com/en-us/money/realestate/realtors-reach-settlement-that-will-change-how-americans-buy-and-sell-homes/ar-BB1jXkB8?ocid=entnewsntp&amp;pc=U531&amp;cvid=b3ed9742b8424896bd8dfc127209c225&amp;ei=14" data-wpel-link="external" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer">$418 million settlement</a> aims to give home buyers more leverage to negotiate with their agents. It could encourage them to navigate the process without agents, potentially reducing commission rates and impacting the number of working agents. Generally speaking, it promises to substantially change how Americans buy and sell homes.
<h2>The Heart of the settlement</h2>
The changes include:
<ul>
 	<li>Buyers will have a better chance to negotiate fees directly with their agents.</li>
 	<li>NAR will stop enforcing rules that require listing offers to state the commission for buyers' agents.</li>
 	<li>With the potential for buyers to skip using agents or to negotiate lower fees, some agents could be driven out of the industry.</li>
</ul>
<h2>Potential Effects on home sales</h2>
The implications of this settlement are vast:
<ul>
 	<li><strong>Shift in control:</strong> Sellers used to set the commission for buyers' agents, but that's changing.</li>
 	<li><strong>Consumer savings: </strong>Buyers may now save on commissions, which have been higher in the U.S. than in most countries.</li>
 	<li><strong>Class action payout: </strong>The settlement funds will go to recent home sellers, potentially affecting around 50 million people.</li>
</ul>
<h2>New challenges and opportunities</h2>
The real estate industry must navigate through this new landscape. Industry experts anticipate that the industry will be more open to technological disruptions, which have previously reduced fees in other sectors. Moreover, real estate agents will need to establish clear agreements with clients regarding their services and fees. There could also be fewer buyers using agents.
<h2>A new era for home buying</h2>
This landmark agreement marks a pivotal moment in real estate. It offers a fresh set of challenges and opportunities, not just for agents and the NAR but also for home buyers and sellers. As the industry adapts to these changes, the traditional ways of buying and selling homes will evolve, leading to more cost-effective and transparent transactions. Because of these changes and others to come, it will be crucial to work with a real estate law attorney <a href="https://www.mwlawfirm.com/real-estate-banking-finance/" data-wpel-link="internal">to better understand the new transaction process</a> and related costs.]]></content>
						        </entry>
	        <entry>
            <author>
									                    <name>On Behalf of McCarn, Weir, &amp; Sherwood Attorneys at Law</name>
				            </author>
            <title type="html"><![CDATA[Atmos Energy Corp V. Paul: Blanket Pipeline Easement Agreements May Allow For Multiple Easement Paths]]></title>
            <link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://www.mwlawfirm.com/blog/2022/03/atmos-energy-corp-v-paul-blanket-pipeline-easement-agreements-may-allow-for-multiple-easement-paths/" />
            <id>https://www.mwlawfirm.com/?p=46114</id>
            <updated>2025-02-21T13:42:27Z</updated>
            <published>2022-03-23T01:41:44Z</published>
					<taxo:topics><![CDATA[-]]></taxo:topics>
            <summary type="html"><![CDATA[Atmos Energy Corp. v. Paul, 598 S.W.3d 431 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2020, no pet.) held that a blanket easement, which permitted the holder to construct multiple pipelines, authorized the holder to build across multiple paths.  In 1960, Atmos’ predecessor-in-interest, Lone Star Gas Company, and Paul’s predecessors-in-interest entered into an Easement Agreement which covered 137 acres of property.   In the Agreement,…]]></summary>
			                <content type="html" xml:base="https://www.mwlawfirm.com/blog/2022/03/atmos-energy-corp-v-paul-blanket-pipeline-easement-agreements-may-allow-for-multiple-easement-paths/"><![CDATA[Atmos Energy Corp. v. Paul, 598 S.W.3d 431 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2020, no pet.) held that a blanket easement, which permitted the holder to construct multiple pipelines, authorized the holder to build across multiple paths.  In 1960, Atmos’ predecessor-in-interest, Lone Star Gas Company, and Paul’s predecessors-in-interest entered into an Easement Agreement which covered 137 acres of property.   In the Agreement, Paul’s predecessors conveyed Lone Star “the right of way and easement to construct, maintain and operate pipe lines and appurtenances thereto . . . over and through the following described lands situated in Denton County. . . .   The property was described as a 137 acre tract, and it did not include a metes and bounds description.  Additionally, the Agreement included a payment provision that set the payment amount “[s]hould more than one pipe line be laid under this grant at any time. . . .”   That year, Lone Star installed Line W.   Paul thereafter purchased 64 acres of the property’s 137 acres, and Atmos succeeded to Lone Star’s interest.   The Line W easement crossed the 64 acres.   In 2017, Atmos proposed a new pipeline, Line WD, which would cross a different portion of Paul’s land.   Paul rejected the new pipeline, arguing that the Easement Agreement allows for multiple pipelines but only one easement path, which was set by Lone Star when it laid Line W.   Atmos argued the Easement Agreement granted a blanket easement and sued Paul for breach of contract.   The probate court granted Paul’s summary judgment motion and declared that the 1960 easement was not a blanket easement.   Atmos appealed, and the court of appeals reversed and remanded.

The court of appeals began its analysis by examining the Easement Agreement and whether it qualifies as a blanket easement.   “Under Texas law, a ‘blanket easement’ is ‘[a]n easement without a metes and bounds description of its location on the property’” Paul, 598 S.W.3d at 446 (quoting First Am. Title Ins. Co. of Tex. v. Willard, 949 S.W.2d 342, 344 n.2 (Tex. App.—Tyler 1997, writ denied)).   “The purpose of a blanket easement is for the practical convenience of the easement holder to alter the exact location of the lines during construction”. The Easement Agreement in the present case does not contain a metes and bounds which specifies the exact location of the easement and instead references the entire 137 acres.   Additionally, there is no language limiting the location or dimensions of any pipelines that are constructed on the property.   Accordingly, the court concluded that the Easement Agreement unambiguously created a blanket easement.

Paul relied on certain caselaw, including Houston Pipe Line Company v. Dwyer, 374 S.W.2d 662 (Tex. 1964), to argue the Easement Agreement allows for multiple pipelines across only one easement path, which was set when Line W was constructed.   In Dwyer, landowners granted a pipeline company a blanket easement to lay one pipeline across their land.   The pipeline company laid a line with an eighteen-inch diameter in 1926, and in 1959 it removed the pipeline and installed a line with a thirty-inch diameter.   The Supreme Court of Texas ruled that installing the thirty-inch pipeline was impermissible because once the eighteen-inch line was installed the grant became definite and fixed, and the pipeline size could not be increased nor its location changed.   Paul contended that this ruling supports a holding that Line W set a fixed easement path of reasonable width to allow the placement of multiple lines and that the lines could not be placed elsewhere on the property.   The court disagreed, concluding that <em>Dwyer</em> is distinguishable because it involves a single pipeline blanket easement.   The court cited other opinions which similarly distinguished the Dwyer ruling, noting that: “A grant may authorize a use greater than the one actually used, and such prior use does not nullify the greater rights conveyed in the grant.”

Paul also relied on the ruling in Boland v. Nat. Gas Pipeline Co. of Am., 816 S.W.2d 843 (Tex. App. Fort Worth 1991, no writ.).  Specifically, he pointed to the finding in Boland for the proposition that express language concerning multiple paths is necessary in the grant, and because the Easement Agreement does not contain the requisite express language the grant is limited to a single easement path.   The court concluded that Boland does not mention the necessity of such express language and reasoned that such language would convey multiple paths but was not necessary.   The court also disagreed that Paul’s additional cited caselaw supported his position due to his misinterpretations of the facts and holdings.

Paul additionally argued that the language in the Easement Agreement supported his position.   Paul contended that the terms “the,” “right-of-way,” “easement,” “over,” and “through” in the conveyance of “the right of way and easement to construct, maintain and operate pipe lines and appurtenances thereto . . . over and through the following described lands . . .” indicate the conveyance of a singular easement path.   The court held that Paul’s interpretation relies on select portions of narrow term definitions in the dictionary, and the generally accepted definitions do not support his position.   It also held that his interpretation does not give effect to all of the provisions in the Easement Agreement.   While Paul interpreted the word “the” in “the right of way and easement” as referring to a singular physical easement, the court noted that “the” simply refers to the right being granted if the entire Easement Agreement is considered.

Significance

The significance of the case is the holding that a multiple <a href="/oil-and-gas/pipeline-easements/" data-wpel-link="internal">pipeline blanket easement</a> may permit more than one easement path sans express language of such permission.  The Texas Supreme Court in Dwyer held that under a blanket easement the location and size may become fixed once the pipeline is installed.  However, in Dwyer, the easement agreement authorized the construction of one pipeline.  An agreement authorizing a single pipeline is different from an agreement authorizing multiple pipelines because unless the agreement expressly fixes the location, an easement agreement granting the right to construct multiple pipelines will grant the equivalent of “multiple floating easements.”]]></content>
						        </entry>
	        <entry>
            <author>
									                    <name>On Behalf of McCarn, Weir, &amp; Sherwood Attorneys at Law</name>
				            </author>
            <title type="html"><![CDATA[Flores V. Zimprich: Considerations For Property Conveyance Descriptions]]></title>
            <link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://www.mwlawfirm.com/blog/2022/02/flores-v-zimprich-considerations-for-property-conveyance-descriptions/" />
            <id>https://www.mwlawfirm.com/?p=46115</id>
            <updated>2024-04-16T16:11:02Z</updated>
            <published>2022-02-09T02:48:45Z</published>
					<taxo:topics><![CDATA[-]]></taxo:topics>
            <summary type="html"><![CDATA[Flores v. Zimprich, 559 S.W.3d 223 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2018, no pet.) held that a property owner met his burden of proof to establish his ownership interest, along with the boundary between two parcels of land, and that a correction deed between the parties was valid.  Martinez owned an undivided tract of land and the residence and commercial building located…]]></summary>
			                <content type="html" xml:base="https://www.mwlawfirm.com/blog/2022/02/flores-v-zimprich-considerations-for-property-conveyance-descriptions/"><![CDATA[Flores v. Zimprich, 559 S.W.3d 223 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2018, no pet.) held that a property owner met his burden of proof to establish his ownership interest, along with the boundary between two parcels of land, and that a correction deed between the parties was valid.  Martinez owned an undivided tract of land and the residence and commercial building located on it.   The commercial building was located on Socorro Road and the residence on Dini Rozi Road.   Martinez sold the Socorro portion of the tract, with the commercial building, to Aleman and the Socorro note to Luevano.   In 2006, a plat was prepared of the Dini Rozi subdivision (the “Plat”).   Later in 2006, Martinez sold the Dini Rozi portion of the tract, with the residence building, to Betts.   Aleman stopped making payments on the note, and Luevano accepted a deed in lieu of foreclosure.   The Betts then sold the Dini Rozi property to Heredias, and Heredias thereafter constructed a wall between the two properties.   In March 2007, Heredias went to the City of Socorro to apply for a permit, and the City requested a survey.   In August 2007, Heredias signed the 2006 Plat.   Upon noticing a discrepancy between the Betts deed and the Plat, Luevano subsequently approached Heredias about signing a Correction Deed, indicating its purpose as a lot split.   Mistakenly believing the Correction Deed to be related to their discussions with the City, Heredias signed the Correction Deed.   The Correction Deed stated that the land conveyed was 0.3209 acres, but the size was actually smaller as a result of the metes and bounds correction.   In 2008, Luevano conveyed the Socorro property to Zimprich.   Both Zimprich (the owner of the commercial tract) and Heredias (the owner of the residential tract) made improvements to the disputed land.   In 2011, Zimprich filed suit under a trespass to try title claim and sought judgment for removal of the wall.   Heredias counterclaimed with a quiet title suit and a claim against Luevano for fraud.   During the trial, Heredias signed a Deed of Trust which contained the same legal description as the Correction Deed.   The trial court held that Zimprich was the owner of the disputed land, and the wall was on his land.   The court also held that Luevano fraudulently procured the Correction Deed.   The court of appeals affirmed.

The court first addressed Heredias’ assertion that the Correction Deed should be invalid because (1) there were no facial imperfections in the original deed or in the Heredias’ chain-of-title, (2) Heredias did not agree to the Correction Deed, (3) there was no mutual mistake which caused a defect in the original deed, and (4) a correction deed cannot convey an additional, separate parcel of land, not included in the original deed.   Heredias relied on Myrad, a Texas Supreme Court case, which held that a correction deed could not be used to include an additional parcel of land not described in the original deed.   Responding to Myrad in 2011, the Texas legislature enacted statutes which allow correction deeds to make both material and nonmaterial deed corrections under certain circumstances.   The statutes apply to correction instruments filed before September 1, 2011, as is the case of the Correction Deed that was executed by Heredias.   The court noted Heredias failed to mention the statutes and the statutory requirements for correction deeds in their brief, and noted that it was not permitted to argue on behalf of Heredias nor make their arguments for them.   The applicable statutes do not limit corrections to facial imperfections in the original deed or chain-of-title nor require the existence of a mutual mistake as the cause of defect in the original deed.   While Heredias argued that they did not agree to the Correction Deed because of the fraud, the court held that they evidenced acquiescence to the changes by signing the Plat and Deed of Trust, which contained the same metes and bounds as the Correction Deed.   Accordingly, the court overruled the argument.

Heredias next asserted that Zimprich failed to meet an element of his trespass to try title action—establishing superior title.   The court noted that when the sole dispute involves a boundary location, as in the present case, a recorded deed is sufficient to establish superior title.   Otherwise, the court imposes strict proof requirements.   To prove the correct metes and bounds, Zimprich introduced multiple recorded documents, including: (1) the deed from Luevano to Zimprich; (2) the correction deed from Martinez to Aleman; (3) the corrected deed in lieu of foreclosure from Aleman to Luevano; (4) the correction deed from Martinez to Betts; (5) the correction deed from Betts to Heredias; (6) the Plat signed by Heredias; and (7) the Deed of Trust signed by Heredias.  The court concluded that the foregoing were sufficient proof to establish Zimprich’s interest in the disputed land and the correct metes and bounds.

Heredias additionally contended that the trial court erred by failing to declare the Correction Deed void as a remedy for their prevailing fraud claim against Luevano.   “An action to cancel a deed procured by fraud and vest title to the realty in the grantor is a suit to quiet title.”   An element of a suit to quiet title is proving the other party’s claim to title invalid.   The court noted that a ruling in favor of Zimprich on his trespass to try title claim is effectively a ruling against Heredias on a suit to quiet title, and the court thus overruled the issue.

Flores included a lengthy dissent wherein the dissenting judge disagreed that Zimprich should prevail on his trespass to try title suit.   The judge disputed the majority’s analysis of caselaw concerning the proof requirements of a “boundary dispute” and additionally argued there were two complicating factors involved here—fraudulent misrepresentations and correction instruments.   The dissenting judge concluded Zimprich’s trespass to try title suit should have instead been subject to strict proof requirements as opposed to the relaxed requirements applied in boundary disputes, and the judge concluded that Zimprich’s claim did not satisfy the stricter requirements.   Additionally, the judge noted Zimprich mistakenly relied on a Deed of Trust and Plat to prove ownership, but these instruments cannot convey title to property.   The majority also concluded that Heredias acquiesced to the change in metes and bounds by signing the plat and the Correction Deed, but the dissenting judge found that it was impossible to prove Heredias acquiesced based on signatures that were obtained through fraud.

Significance

The case serves as a reminder that parties may make material and nonmaterial deed corrections under certain circumstances, and great care should be taken when describing property being conveyed.]]></content>
						        </entry>
	        <entry>
            <author>
									                    <name>On Behalf of McCarn, Weir, &amp; Sherwood Attorneys at Law</name>
				            </author>
            <title type="html"><![CDATA[Piranha Partners V. Neuhoff: Considerations For Identifying Interests Being Assigned]]></title>
            <link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://www.mwlawfirm.com/blog/2022/01/piranha-partners-v-neuhoff-considerations-for-identifying-interests-being-assigned/" />
            <id>https://www.mwlawfirm.com/?p=46116</id>
            <updated>2025-02-21T13:48:26Z</updated>
            <published>2022-01-27T02:51:31Z</published>
					<taxo:topics><![CDATA[-]]></taxo:topics>
            <summary type="html"><![CDATA[Piranha Partners v. Neuhoff, 596 S.W.3d 740 (Tex. 2020) held that an assignment of an overriding royalty interest conveyed the entire override and was not limited to the well that was described.  Neuhoff owned a 3.75% overriding royalty interest that burdened the Puryear Lease which covered all of Section 28, and executed an “Assignment of Overriding Royalty Interests and Oil…]]></summary>
			                <content type="html" xml:base="https://www.mwlawfirm.com/blog/2022/01/piranha-partners-v-neuhoff-considerations-for-identifying-interests-being-assigned/"><![CDATA[Piranha Partners v. Neuhoff, 596 S.W.3d 740 (Tex. 2020) held that an assignment of an overriding royalty interest conveyed the entire override and was not limited to the well that was described.  Neuhoff owned a 3.75% overriding royalty interest that burdened the Puryear Lease which covered all of Section 28, and executed an “Assignment of Overriding Royalty Interests and <a href="/oil-and-gas/" data-wpel-link="internal">Oil and Gas</a> Leases” in favor of Piranha.   In the Assignment’s granting clause “[Neuhoff] does hereby assign, sell and convey unto [Piranha] . . . subject to the limitations, conditions, reservations and exceptions hereinafter set forth . . . all of [Neuhoff’s] right, title and interest in and to the properties described in Exhibit ‘A’ (the ‘Properties’).”   Exhibit “A” describes the “Puryear #1-28” well and the northwest quarter of Section 28, under the heading “Lands and associated Well(s),” and describes the Puryear Lease by Lessor, Lessee, and recording information under the heading “Oil and Gas Lease(s)/Farmout Agreement(s).”

The operator under the Puryear Lease paid a 3.75% overriding royalty on production from the #1-28 well to Piranha.   However, the operator subsequently drilled additional wells in Section 28 and paid the 3.75% override to Neuhoff, believing that the Assignment was limited to the Puryear #1 28 well.   After obtaining title opinions, which concluded that Neuhoff conveyed its entire interest under the Puryear Lease, the operator retroactively paid Piranha proceeds attributable to the 3.75% override from all of the wells in Section 28 and demanded a refund from Neuhoff.   Neuhoff filed suit claiming that Neuhoff only sold Piranha an overriding royalty interest in production from the Puryear #1-28 well.   The trial court held that Neuhoff assigned all of its interest in the Puryear Lease.   Neuhoff appealed, with the court of appeals reversing the trial court’s holding and ruling that Neuhoff assigned all of its interest in the northwest quarter of Section 28.   Piranha appealed, and the Texas Supreme Court granted its petition for review.

Piranha argued that the Court should rely on three rules of construction which courts apply when construing deeds.   Specifically, Piranha asserts the Assignment should be construed (1) to confer the greatest possible estate that the instrument will permit, (2) to reject any alleged exception, reservation, or limitation that is not expressly and clearly stated in the Assignment, and (3) to resolve any doubts against the party that drafted the Assignment.

The Court rejected the application of the second rule because the dispute involves language in a conveyance and not language in a reservation.   The Court also rejected the application of the third rule because the rule is only applicable when the instrument is ambiguous, and the Court held that the Assignment was not ambiguous.   Accordingly, the Court focused on the only applicable rule of construction, the greatest possible estate rule, and found that the intent of the parties was apparent by examining the entirety of the Assignment.

Examining the language in the Assignment, the Court held that Neuhoff assigned all of its right, title and interest in the Lease.  Using a “holistic and harmonizing approach,” the Court focused on four provisions to determine the parties’ intent.   First, Paragraph 1, following the granting clause, describes the interests being assigned as “All oil and gas leases, <a href="/oil-and-gas/mineral-rights-and-leasing/" data-wpel-link="internal">mineral fee properties</a> or other interests, INSOFAR AND ONLY INSOFAR as set out in Exhibit A . . . which [interest] shall include any working interest, leasehold rights, overriding royalty interests and reversionary rights held by [Neuhoff], as of the Effective Date.”   The Court held that this paragraph did not just incorporate Exhibit A, it explains that Exhibit A includes any overriding royalty interests that Neuhoff owned, to the extent identified in the Exhibit.  Next, the Court cited Paragraph 2, wherein Neuhoff included in the Assignment “[a]ll presently existing contracts to the extent they are assignable and to the extent they affect the Leases. . . .”   The Court cited this provision as evidence that the parties intended the Assignment to include all rights in “the Leases” as opposed to a well or the land.  Finally, Paragraph 1 of Section II provides that “overriding royalty interest(s) herein assigned, if any, are payable . . . pursuant to the terms and provisions of the oil and gas leases described in Exhibit A,” and paragraph 3 of the same section includes a proportionate reduction paragraph that also references oil and gas leases.   The four provisions all directly point to the oil and gas leases described in Exhibit A, not a wellbore interest in Exhibit A, and confirm that the Assignment conveyed to Piranha all of Neuhoff’s overriding royalty interest in the Puryear Lease.

Two Supreme Court judges dissented.  They would have held that the Assignment was ambiguous and remanded the case to the trial court to submit the interpretation of the Assignment to a jury.

Significance

The significance of the case is that it provides an example of how the Court approaches construing deeds and similar documents in connection with interests identified on an attached exhibit.  The case highlights the importance of identifying interests unambiguously and in detail on an attached exhibit and also throughout the entirety of the document.]]></content>
						        </entry>
	        <entry>
            <author>
									                    <name>On Behalf of McCarn, Weir, &amp; Sherwood Attorneys at Law</name>
				            </author>
            <title type="html"><![CDATA[Geary V. Two Bow Ranch: Appellate Court Holds That “Provisional Authority” To Exercise Executive Rights Is Not Assignable]]></title>
            <link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://www.mwlawfirm.com/blog/2022/01/geary-v-two-bow-ranch-appellate-court-holds-that-provisional-authority-to-exercise-executive-rights-is-not-assignable/" />
            <id>https://www.mwlawfirm.com/?p=46117</id>
            <updated>2025-02-21T13:51:59Z</updated>
            <published>2022-01-20T02:54:10Z</published>
					<taxo:topics><![CDATA[-]]></taxo:topics>
            <summary type="html"><![CDATA[Geary v. Two Bow Ranch Ltd., P’ship, No. 04-18-00610-CV, 2020 Tex. App. LEXIS 552 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Jan. 22, 2020, pet. denied) held that a mineral owner was not required to share lease bonus because the mineral owner only leased his interest.  In 1981, Geary executed a warranty deed conveying certain property to Meader.  The 1981 deed provides the following: [Grantors]…]]></summary>
			                <content type="html" xml:base="https://www.mwlawfirm.com/blog/2022/01/geary-v-two-bow-ranch-appellate-court-holds-that-provisional-authority-to-exercise-executive-rights-is-not-assignable/"><![CDATA[Geary v. Two Bow Ranch Ltd., P’ship, No. 04-18-00610-CV, 2020 Tex. App. LEXIS 552 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Jan. 22, 2020, pet. denied) held that a mineral owner was not required to share lease bonus because the mineral owner only leased his interest.  In 1981, Geary executed a warranty deed conveying certain property to Meader.  The 1981 deed provides the following:

[Grantors] by these presents do GRANT, SELL AND CONVEY unto MEADER CONSTRUCTION CO., INC. (herein referred to as “Grantee”) all that certain real property situated in Bandera County, Texas described within Exhibit “A” attached hereto, together with . . . one-half (1/2) of all oil, gas and other minerals and related executory rights and interests associated therewith currently held by Grantors (all of which is collectively referred to herein as “the Property”).

Grantors expressly reserve and retain unto themselves one-half (1/2) of all oil, gas and other minerals and related executory rights and interests associated therewith currently held by Grantors.  Grantee may control the executory rights pertaining to the minerals provided the Grantors and Grantee share equally in any and all proceeds related thereto.

The court referred to the last quoted sentence above as the “Provisional Authority” clause.  In 1991, Meader conveyed its interest to Bandera, and in 1999 Bandera conveyed its interest to Two Bow Ranch.  In 2011, Two Bow Ranch executed an <a href="/oil-and-gas/" data-wpel-link="internal">oil and gas lease</a> which covered the Property.  Geary sued Two Bow Ranch contending that the 2011 lease bonus should be shared pursuant to the 1981 deed’s Provisional Authority clause.  Two Bow Ranch counterclaimed and moved for summary judgment, which the trial court granted.  Geary appealed, raising seven issues which the court grouped as:  (1) the Provisional Authority was assignable and was assigned; (2) Two Bow Ranch breached contractual and fiduciary duties to share the lease bonus; (3) Two Bow Ranch breached fiduciary duties to lease Geary’s interest on the same terms as its own, or to inform Geary of its lease; (4) reversal and remand are necessary if the deed or 2011 lease is ambiguous; and (5) Geary is entitled to attorney’s fees.

The court began its analysis by looking at the central question of the appeal—whether Two Bow Ranch had any authority to exercise Geary’s executive rights.  Geary argued that the deed conveyed Meader ownership of the executive rights in all of the Property, subject to the condition that it must share any benefit it receives from exercising said rights with the Grantors.  The court disagreed, stating that the plain meaning of “related” and “associated therewith” in the deed limits the “executory rights and interests” to those attached to the conveyed one-half mineral interest.  Both parties additionally argued that the deed should be interpreted in light of certain cases involving executive rights.  The court was not persuaded that the line of cases controlled here because they involved conveyances by the owner of previously severed executive rights.

The court next turned to the Provisional Authority clause, which it summarized as granting Meader conditional authority to exercise the Grantors’ executive rights in their one-half mineral interest.  Geary argued that the Provisional Authority is transferable because the deed’s habendum clause states the conveyance is to “Grantee, its successors and assigns forever.”  The Court noted the language Geary relied upon is in the deed’s habendum clause, which conveys “the Property, together with all and singular the rights and appurtenances thereto in any wise belonging unto the said Grantee, its successors and assigns forever . . . .”  The court stated that the “Property,” as defined in the deed, does not include the reserved one-half mineral interest or the associated conditional authority, and thus the Provisional Authority is not assignable under the plain language of the deed.  Geary next argued that the Provisional Authority is assignable as a contract right because contracts are generally assignable.  The court held that even if the Provisional Authority was assignable as a contract right, summary judgment evidence conclusively established it was not assigned in the 1991 deed or in the 1999 deed to Two Bow Ranch, and as a result, Two Bow Ranch did not have conditional authority to exercise the executive rights as to Geary’s one-half mineral interest.

In the second issue, Geary argued that Two Bow Ranch effectively leased the entire mineral interest in the 2011 Lease by not including a limitation in the lease, and that Two Bow Ranch must therefore share the lease bonus it received from exercising Geary’s executive right.  The court recited its earlier holding that Two Bow Ranch only had the authority to exercise its own executive rights and lease its own <a href="/oil-and-gas/mineral-rights-and-leasing/" data-wpel-link="internal">mineral interest</a>.  As a result, the 2011 Lease does not include Geary’s interest.

In the third issue, Geary argued that Two Bow Ranch breached a duty owed under the deed and breached a fiduciary duty as holder of Geary’s executive rights.  The court held this claim was precluded because the deed did not impose any duties and Two Bow Ranch was not the holder of Geary’s executive rights.  In the fourth issue, Geary argued that Two Bow Ranch owed a duty to inform Geary that it was leasing its interest.  Since Geary did not raise this claim before the trial court, the court overruled this issue, but the court would not have ruled in Geary’s favor for the same reasons it denied Geary’s other claims.  The court overruled the final issue for recovery of attorney’s fees because Geary was not the prevailing party.

Significance

The holding is significant because it provides an example of interests in a deed that are not assignable.  The case largely turned on the plain meaning of the deed’s provisions and exemplifies how parties should carefully review assignability provisions when drafting a deed.]]></content>
						        </entry>
	</feed>